Patient Negligence by Goodwin, Michele & Richardson, L. Song
GOODWIN RICHARDSON 5/1/2010 1:16:55 PM 
 
PATIENT NEGLIGENCE 
MICHELE GOODWIN* 
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I 
INTRODUCTION 
This project initiates a conversation about patient negligence and trust in 
the medical setting. It operates as a thought experiment, imagining tort law and 
the physician–patient relationship through an alternative lens—one that is 
inspired by the charge of this symposium1 as well as recent high-profile events 
involving obvious fiduciary misdealings. The project examines the line at which 
a physician’s impermissible conduct should become reasonably obvious to a 
patient and therefore trigger a reasonable response. Absent a reasonable 
response by patients, this project considers whether comparative negligence 
attaches. 
This project is narrow in scope, but the import and impact of the question it 
poses and the possible answers it unpacks could prove quite significant as a 
policy matter. We approach this project as an initial casting of the pebble in the 
pond to anticipate possible effects: who might be harmed by and who would 
benefit from such a proposal. Further, as a pragmatic matter, we consider how 
the ripples created by the “pebble effect” impact the lives of those deemed most 
vulnerable to abuse in the physician–patient relationship. The conversation 
imagined for this project extends to policy debates on medical malpractice, 
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 1. Trina Jones has anointed a special project here: a challenge that junior and senior scholars 
collaborate to build a discussion that incorporates their relevant areas of scholarship. This article grows 
out of that charge, engaging tort law and medicine. It also incorporates Jones’s second goal that race 
and class fit into its framework. Specifically, this project unpacks questions of trust and loyalty in the 
context of medicine. Due to page and time constraints we initiate a conversation in this article that will 
hopefully inspire additional comment. As a backdrop, this article provides a soft focus on trust in the 
reproductive context. In that way, it builds on the discussion in Prosecuting The Womb, but rather than 
urge reconsidering the value of fetal drug laws and explaining why states should be more wary about 
prosecuting such cases especially in the absence of a more consistent approach (which treats harm 
caused to babies by parental conduct more uniformly), this project assumes a different goal and 
approach. This article considers the reasonableness of relying on trust in the fiduciary relationship. See 
Michele Goodwin, Prosecuting The Womb, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1657 (2008). 
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patient accountability, health care reform, and the physician–patient re-
lationship. 
Animating this thought experiment are recent crises (outside of the medical 
realm) involving financial breaches of the public trust, which highlight the need 
for an engaged and searching inquiry into trust and loyalty. Prior scholarship 
tackles aspects of trust,2 but most scholarship in this domain fails to scrutinize 
the reasonableness of client or patient reliance on trust and loyalty. Instead, 
trust is treated as an absolute entitlement that provides dividends to clients or 
patients upon a breach.3 Due diligence, an aspect of loyalty, is treated as a value 
fiduciaries owe their clients, rather than a reasonable step that clients owe 
themselves.4 Unmistakably absent from scholarly debates about trust are any 
discussions about whether it might be appropriate to impose an objective 
reasonableness standard on clients in their pursuit and expectation of services.5 
In this collaboration, we imagine and unpack a new theory of trust; one 
which is animated by tort theory, and reads reasonableness and bi-directionality 
into the trust relationship. Motivating our interest here is a gap in traditional 
trust scholarship, which fails to capture a patient-focused standard of 
reasonableness. Recent studies suggest that quality patient care should be the 
focus of the physician–patient relationship. However, the notion that patients 
owe physicians blind trust may obscure that objective. 
Most scholarly inquiry related to trust and loyalty rarely if ever pursues 
questions of complicity, contribution, and comparative fault of the client, 
patient, or consumer. Absent from the public debate are examinations of the 
meaning of trust and the risks of relying on loyalty in fiduciary relationships. 
Specifically, rather than accept the strict-liability logic that patients, clients, and 
consumers can always rely on their fiduciaries, perhaps it would be better to 
examine whether trusting a fiduciary is intuitively correct. Is the security that 
individuals feel in their assumption of a fiduciary’s loyalty rational or 
reasonable? 
Our inquiry into the reasonableness of relying on trust has considerable 
relevance in areas outside the medical setting. Consider the following: 
In the frostbiting closing weeks of 2008, home foreclosures, plummeting 
stocks, and the narratives of defrauded investors dominated news headlines. At 
year’s end, as snow blanketed the northeast, a cold reality set in among 
sophisticated, highly educated investors. Sixty-five billion dollars from charities 
 
 2. See generally M. Gregg Bloche, Comment, Trust and Betrayal in the Medical Marketplace, 55 
STAN. L. REV. 919 (2002); Mark A. Hall, Law, Medicine, and Trust, 55 STAN. L. REV. 463 (2002); Claire 
A. Hill & Erin Ann O’Hara, A Cognitive Theory of Trust, 84 WASH. U. L.R. 1717 (2006); Christopher 
R. Leslie, Trust, Distrust, and Antitrust, 82 TEX. L. REV. 515 (2004). 
 3. See Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L. REV. 795, 819–29 (1983) (discussing the law’s 
protection of the fiduciary relationship through the imposition of nonreciprocal legal obligations). 
 4. See, e.g., id. at 825 (noting that corporate fiduciaries are liable to the corporation for failing to 
exercise due diligence). 
 5. See generally MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY (1980); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT (1983). 
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and individuals who had invested with Bernard Madoff cascaded into a virtual 
abyss. The largest Ponzi scheme in U.S. history began to unravel. Madoff, the 
financier at the center of the fraud, became a household name as charities and 
investors bewailed the profundity of their losses. How Madoff would be 
prosecuted and whether client losses could be recovered dominated news 
reports. Befuddled reporters continued to interview distraught, defrauded 
investors. How could such a betrayal be maintained over years—decades even? 
Unlike the mortgage-crisis victims—individuals characterized as high-risk, 
less-sophisticated, and less-educated borrowers, duped by lenders trained in the 
art of persuasion—Madoff’s victims hailed from an entirely different cultural 
and socioeconomic bracket. But are they so very different? Upon closer 
examination, common threads link manipulated borrowers and defrauded 
investors. In both cases, private losses became public problems. But, more 
importantly for purposes of this article, both groups relied on relationships built 
with their fiduciaries. Some of those relationships were rather short-lived, as in 
the cases of mortgage borrowers. Others, such as Madoff’s mostly Jewish 
clientele, seemingly relied on an affinity relationship as much as on his 
reputation for steady returns over the years. The question that links the duped 
investors with the mortgage fraud victims is how reasonable was their trust 
either in Madoff or in the untested loyalty and commitment of mortgage 
brokers? 
Discussions about defrauded investors and duped consumers of balloon 
mortgages might be enhanced by an exploration of the reasonableness of their 
reliance. In other words, perhaps “reasonableness” should be introduced into 
the discourse on fiduciary responsibility, much as it dominates torts and 
criminal-law discourses. Opening such a discussion might encourage us all to 
think about the subjective and objective tort dimensions of trust and loyalty. 
An inattentive reading of this article might lead some to misconstrue its 
thesis as victim blaming. However, victim blaming disserves its message and 
import. This article seeks to affirm choice, empower patients, realign the 
doctor–patient vertical hierarchy, and disrupt the implied assumption that 
surrendering trust is a quid pro quo element of receiving quality health care. 
The goal here is to ask deeply challenging questions. At the center of this 
inquiry is whether patient negligence can exist, even when a patient has not 
committed an affirmative wrong, but simply acted blindly. This redirection 
might be better understood within the comparative framework of tort law, 
where contributory and comparative negligence doctrines have long and, in 
some cases, checkered pasts. 
A few matters other than what might be viewed as victim blaming 
complicate this article’s thesis or expose its weaknesses. First, this article 
displaces or complicates notions of innocence by asking whether an innocent 
patient can be legally at fault for personally negligent behavior. Second, some 
scholars might argue that this article proposes an unnecessary complication to 
or imposition on legal adjudication. Why not keep the legal (civil or criminal) 
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adjudication of these matters simple? By continuing a strict-liability approach, 
the argument goes, all liability is rightfully imposed on fiduciaries whose breach 
of trust results in harm. As a corollary, it could be argued that transaction costs 
are minimized or reduced when the law concerns itself solely with the primary 
wrongdoer. Finally, whether the defrauded client or aggrieved patient can also 
be a wrongdoer is a question that might be rejected intuitively on moral 
grounds. 6 
Assessing the appropriateness of applying negligence to patients requires 
confronting an unmistakable power dynamic7 highlighted by information gaps 
that reify the victim status of patients and an imbalance of expertise. A patient’s 
disadvantage in the physician–patient relationship is intensified when a patient 
lacks the capacity to properly investigate the fiduciary’s work product. As a 
result, any exploration of patient culpability may seem deeply incongruous. Yet 
motivating this article are lofty ideas that relate to reducing social harms, 
protecting patients by requiring affirmative behaviors, bridging the gaps of 
accountability, and distinguishing the capacities of some consumer “victims” 
from others. 
In this article, we attempt to take on a discrete aspect of such a 
reasonableness inquiry. We consider how a dialogue about trust might be recast 
with the application of reasonableness in the physician–patient relationship. 
Part II provides a very brief background in tort law’s comparative negligence 
regime. In part III, we provide an overview of breaches of medical trust in the 
United States, locating contemporary reproductive monitoring in a historical 
context. Part IV considers whether the goals of established trust discourse 
properly and realistically align with contemporary problems. In part V, we 
begin to articulate the appropriate ex post inquiries for determining whether a 
patient acted reasonably in trusting the fiduciary. Here, we propose a test that 
considers the patient’s competence, knowledge, prior experience, access to 
information, and resources to investigate. This test, we argue, provides a more 
nuanced approach for ascertaining the circumstances under which it might be 
reasonable for a patient to rely on a fiduciary. Naturally, an ex post inquiry 
 
 6. Typically, “negligence” involves an obvious harm to a second or third party. Motivating the 
call for justice in typical negligence cases, then, are the externalities created from the breach of care. In 
the investor–broker context, most would not suggest that defrauded investors were negligent as a 
matter of law. In such an inquiry, fault would presumably flow from broker to defrauded investor (x•y). 
This article maintains the importance of keeping open the possibility of fault emanating from the client 
although not necessarily manifesting against the broker, but rather the investor’s (client’s) interests 
(y•). Equally, in more-extreme cases, it may be possible, although not nearly as often plausible, that 
negligence may flow from investor to a third party (y•z). In the in utero cases discussed later in this 
article, it is debatable whether there is an external third party harmed by the conduct of the patient. 
The legal status of fetuses is deeply contested in tort law, and courts typically dismiss claims for in utero 
injuries sustained by fetuses when no birth results. See Endresz v. Friedberg, 248 N.E.2d 901, 905 (N.Y. 
1969) (holding that a woman could not recover for wrongful death because her twins were delivered 
stillborn). 
 7. But see Richard A. Epstein, The Erosion of Individual Autonomy in Medical Decisionmaking: 
Of the FDA and IRBs, 96 GEO. L.J. 559 (2008). 
GOODWIN RICHARDSON 5/1/2010 1:16:55 PM 
Fall 2009] PATIENT NEGLIGENCE 227 
lacks the efficiency of an ex ante algorithm for determining patient or client 
negligence; however, we leave open as an important empirical matter whether 
deterrence is achieved by ex post deterrence measures (including reduced 
judgments). Part VI concludes. 
II 
COMPARATIVE FAULT: A BRIEF OVERVIEW 
 Tort law operates as a form of ex post insurance. It provides aggrieved 
(injured, defrauded, and otherwise harmed) individuals with access to courts to 
redress their harm. Tort law provides a remedy, which is usually financial, 
against wrong-doers for an individual’s suffering. Commonly, the language of 
“making the plaintiff whole” is invoked to describe what tort law does. Others 
view tort law as restoring an individual to her previous or “pre-tort” condition. 
As an economic matter, rather than imposing (or spreading) the costs of an 
injury on members of society, our legal system generally seeks to narrow 
recovery and shift costs or impose penalties on the person committing the tort.8 
Overall, we assume this dynamic lowers the costs of accidents because it cabins 
the wrongdoing.9 This function within tort law, to provide recovery for the 
injured and narrow costs to defendants, emanates from the doctrine’s core 
principles. 
A succinct view of tort law is that it facilitates compensation to aggrieved 
parties, while promoting social order.10 At a glance, it removes the incentive for 
vigilantism or violent redress of a physical or emotional harm. But, such a 
narrow view of tort law overlooks its economic and broader social goals and 
interests. Tort law disincentivizes irresponsible conduct by imposing financial 
penalties on wrong-doers. Tort law illuminates defendants’ conduct as having 
consequences that are beyond the individual plaintiff, and that spread to others 
in similar situations. Its compensatory function serves not only to disincentivize 
poor (reckless or negligent) behavior, but also operates as an incentive to 
improve conduct, elevate industry standards, self regulate, and impose internal 
checks. Moreover, tort law cannot focus exclusively on plaintiff’s harm because 
doing so would distort the broader aims of tort law to minimize risks—even 
those that the plaintiff could have avoided. This view of tort law takes into 
account its moral foundations,11 its liability origins,12 its common law 
 
 8. Although industries spread costs of accidents among consumers in sometimes very indirect 
ways, an examination of cost-sharing is beyond the scope of this specific project. 
 9. See William P. Kratkze, Some Recommendations Concerning Tort Liability of Government and 
Its Employees for Torts and Constitutional Torts, 9 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 1105, 1127, (1996) (“[T]he 
purpose of tort law . . . is to minimize the combined costs of accident prevention and expected accident 
costs.”). 
 10. See, e.g., Cecil A. Wright, Introduction to the Law of Torts, 8 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 238, 238 (1944) 
(“The purpose of the law of torts is to adjust . . . losses and to afford compensation for injuries 
sustained by one person as the result of the conduct of another.”). 
 11. See generally James Barr Ames, Law and Morals, 22 HARV. L. REV. 97 (1908).  
 12. See John H. Wigmore, Responsibility for Tortious Acts: Its History, 7 HARV. L. REV. 315 
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foundations, and contemporary aspirations of tort law operating as a living 
body of law.13 
Tort law is based on the assumption that members of society owe a duty to 
their fellow citizens to avoid engaging in behaviors that could cause injury to 
others. To calibrate when a duty is owed, courts rely on a “reasonable person” 
standard. This objective standard inquires how a reasonable person would act in 
a like situation. The reasonable person framework is employed to calibrate both 
the defendant’s culpability and the plaintiff’s fault for ignoring the risks 
inherent in the activity. 
Tort law doctrine uses the language of breach to describe when a person 
fails to comply with or obey this expectation. Most commonly, students 
associate the language of breach to negligence cases as the elements for that 
cause of action directly engage the language and action of breach. However, 
within the realm of intentional torts, we also expect individuals to comport with 
a generally accepted social code of conduct and not breach a duty to fellow 
citizens by resorting to fisticuffs, making threats that could place individuals in 
imminent apprehension of harm, or disturbing property. 
Tort law’s evolution in the twentieth century coincided with advancements 
in medical technology (and mistakes), automobile and railroad industries 
(crashes and mechanical failures), and industries using scientific advancements 
that happened to be big polluters. But tort law’s evolution can also be traced to 
an identification and acknowledgement of broader social conceptions of harm, 
such as emotional distress, sexual assault, gender discrimination, and racial 
discrimination. 
The contemporary landscape of tort law, which we address in this project, 
involves another evolution within tort law, and that is comparative negligence,14 
which turns the court’s eye from the defendant’s conduct to that of the plaintiff. 
Traditionally, courts dismissed plaintiffs’ claims that involved any culpability or 
fault by the plaintiff.15 Defendants could use the plaintiff’s contributory 
negligence as an affirmative defense. A plaintiff’s fault became a total bar to all 
 
(1894). 
 13. Michele Goodwin, Expressive Minimalism and Fuzzy Signals: The Judiciary and The Role of 
Law, 84 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 19 (2009). 
 14. Comparative negligence is an attempt to equitably assign liability and balance fault between 
the defendant and plaintiff. Comparative negligence acknowledges that victims make mistakes, take 
risks, and, in many cases, assume the roles of willful although negligent actors. DAN B. DOBBS, THE 
LAW OF TORTS 497–98 (2000). There are three approaches to the comparative negligence doctrine: 
pure, modified fifty percent, and modified forty-nine percent. Each approach rejects the notion that “at 
fault” plaintiffs must be barred from recovery. In all comparative negligence jurisdictions, findings of 
fact must be made on two issues: the amount of plaintiff’s damages and the percentage of a plaintiff’s 
fault. See id. at 505–06. 
 15. See Williams v. Delta Int’l Mach. Corp., 619 So. 2d 1330, 1333 (Ala. 1993) (“After this 
exhaustive study and these lengthy deliberations, the majority of the Court, for various reasons, has 
decided that we should not abandon the doctrine of contributory negligence, which has been the law in 
Alabama for approximately 162 years.”). 
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recovery even when the fault was as low five percent.16 As a contemporary 
matter, nearly all states have abandoned that rule for a more evolved and 
arguably more equitable, less draconian, standard of comparative negligence.17 
By moving away from contributory negligence, courts repositioned the last 
clear chance doctrine.18 Traditionally, the less vigilant plaintiff who fails to act 
with reasonable care would be barred from recovering if she had time to avoid 
the harm but failed to act. This move offered plaintiffs an opportunity to 
recover, even when they could have prevented the accident. A classic, relatable 
example is the car collision involving an oblivious pedestrian who steps into 
oncoming traffic without looking both ways. To reduce damages, a defendant is 
permitted to offer comparative negligence as an affirmative defense. 
Comparative negligence calibrates the percentage of a plaintiff’s fault, and 
measures this against the damages she would otherwise be entitled to receive. 
In other words, a plaintiff that is found to be twenty percent at fault will have 
her total damages reduced by twenty percent. 
This project adds an inquiry to comparative negligence given that in the 
medical sphere, a patient’s lack of culpability is generally assumed. In general, 
patients are presumed to act reasonably even when they might or should know 
that uncommon risks may be associated with receiving care from a particular 
physician (such as the physician who has a history of medical malpractice claims 
being filed against him or her; the physician who acts abusively toward the 
patient; the physician who refuses to answer questions). Indeed, patients are the 
most sympathetic plaintiffs because of the inherent misalignment of power 
relationships between doctors and their patients and the vulnerable status of the 
ill when they seek medical treatments. 
But the realm of treatments or menu of options that doctors offer patients 
has also evolved and expanded. Not all medical treatments relate to illnesses, as 
was the case a century prior. Indeed, increasingly elective, invasive, and non-
essential surgical procedures are on the rise both in the reproductive realm and 
in plastic surgery. This project proposes a more searching inquiry into patient 
accountability and reasonableness. It moves away from assuming that by simply 
being a patient, the reasonableness standard is satisfied. 
 
 16. Contributory negligence serves as a complete bar to plaintiff claims in tort cases.  
“Contributory negligence was an affirmative defense . . . . [O]nce proved, the plaintiff’s causal 
contributory negligence immunized the negligent defendant. The rule was extreme. The plaintiff who 
was guilty of only slight or trivial negligence was barred, even if the defendant was guilty of quite 
serious negligence . . . .” DOBBS, supra note 14, at 494. 
 17. Forty-six states now operate as comparative-negligence jurisdictions. Only Alabama, Maryland, 
North Carolina, and Virginia continue to bar plaintiffs’ recovery for torts in which they too have been 
at fault. Id. at 504. 
 18. See McIntyre v. Balentine, 833 S.W. 2d. 52 (Tenn. 1992) (abandoning contributory negligence 
as a complete bar to plaintiff’s recovery). Note that the last-clear-chance doctrine is not rendered 
obsolete by comparative negligence (despite the court framing it as such). Rather, it could be argued 
that the last-clear-chance doctrine is harmonized within the new framework. Thus if plaintiff could have 
prevented an accident, but failed to do so, her relative degree of fault will be calculated by the courts. 
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This project urges a rethinking of what transpires between physicians and 
patients in an effort to reduce accidents and avoid harms. It scrutinizes whether 
the language of trust in the physician–patient relationship distorts what really 
transpires between these actors. We suggest other dynamics motivate patients’ 
passivity, compliance, or participation with physicians, including the specter of 
the law as an ex post protector against harm. At the core of this project is the 
question of reasonableness with regard to patient conduct. By offering patient 
negligence as a concept to be studied, we do not suggest that a patient’s 
vulnerable status should be ignored. To the contrary, we hope to inspire greater 
patient independence (and empowerment) and a rethinking of the trust 
relationship. 
III 
MEDICAL TRUST BREACHES IN THE CONTEXTS OF SEX, RACE, AND CLASS 
Class, race, and sex figure significantly and thematically in medical care. The 
strange history of race and class intersecting in U.S. medicine dates back to the 
antebellum period with medical experiments on enslaved women.19 The power 
of this unique legacy is well captured in more contemporary contexts too, such 
as medical experimentation on vulnerable and often uninformed patients, 
including illiterate men, children, and prisoners. The Institute of Medicine 
Study in 2002 and the subsequent book, Unequal Treatment,20 provide 
compelling evidence of contemporary discrimination in medicine. Indeed, the 
authors document that the only category of treatment that African Americans 
receive more often than their White counterparts are amputations, which the 
former are three times more likely to receive.21 
The history of modern medicine is replete with far more instances of 
medical trust violations against specifically targeted groups than previously 
acknowledged.22 Yet, only recently has the legacy of medical wrongs against 
vulnerable populations been addressed in popular academic scholarship. In 
particular, racial groups, especially African Americans, have been the unwitting 
victims in medical schemes that involved grave robbing,23 skin and tissue 
transplantation,24 clinical trials,25 and other therapies.26 Perhaps for this reason, 
 
 19. See infra A. 
 20. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES, UNEQUAL TREATMENT: 
CONFRONTING RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN HEALTH CARE (Brian D. Smedley, Adrienne Y. 
Smith & Alan R. Nelson eds., 2003). 
 21. Id. at 6. 
 22. See, e.g., HARRIET WASHINGTON, MEDICAL APARTHEID: THE DARK HISTORY OF MEDICAL 
EXPERIMENTATION ON BLACK AMERICANS FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT (2006). 
 23. MICHELE GOODWIN, BLACK MARKETS: THE SUPPLY AND DEMAND OF BODY PARTS 173 
(2006). 
 24. See Michele Goodwin, Deconstructing Legislative Consent Law: Organ Taking, Racial 
Profiling, & Distributive Justice, 6 VA. J.L. & TECH. 2, 2 (2001) (discussing doctors who harvested 
corneas from corpses without prior consent). 
 25. Holly Auer, Clinical Trials Seek More Minorities AH: Too Few Enrolling in Key Research that 
Can Save Lives, POST & COURIER (Charleston, S.C.), Apr. 25, 2005, at 1A (discussing minority 
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contemporary scholars who investigate such issues are skeptical about new 
therapies specifically targeted at African Americans.27 
This section briefly addresses breaches of medical trust, illuminating stories 
of race, class, and medical wrongdoing. Medical trust discourse is of unique 
relevance to African Americans who count, as sufficient causes for alarm and 
mistrust, eugenic-focused (sterilization) practices in the second half of the last 
century,28 HIV drug research on vulnerable African American children in foster 
care,29 recent cornea transplant scandals involving unwitting families and the 
corpses of African American and Latino gun-violence victims,30 and well-
documented medical disparities. The section concludes by raising normative 
questions that push at the theme of this article, namely, the reasonableness of 
extending trust to medical professionals despite an often tormenting history of 
medical wrongs (often with government complicity) against African Americans. 
At the core of this inquiry are several questions. When African Americans 
appear to give consent or passively participate in medical decisions with 
physicians is this, in fact, trust? Or is it simply the perceived lack of options? 
Does trust attach at the same time that a patient accepts medical care? If trust 
does attach at the time that medical treatment begins, does this expose 
 
participation in clinical trials); Ta-Nehisi Paul Coates, Suspicious Minds; The FDA Has Approved a 
Drug Specifically for Black Americans. But that Doesn't Mean They'll Buy It, TIME, July 4, 2005, at 36 
(discussing briefly the Tuskegee experiments). 
 26. See, e.g., George T. H. Ellison et al., Race, Pharmaceuticals, and Medical Technology: Flaws in 
the U.S. Food and Drug Administration’s Rationale for Supporting the Development and Approval of 
BiDil as a Treatment for Heart Failure Only in Black Patients, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 449 (2008) 
(discussing FDA procedures for approving race-based clinical trials); Jonathan Kahn, From Disparity to 
Difference: How Race-Specific Medicines May Undermine Policies to Address Inequalities in Health 
Care, 15 S. CAL. INTERDIS. L.J. 105 (2005) (raising concerns regarding the use of racial categories in 
medical research); Jonathan Kahn, How a Drug Becomes “Ethnic”: Law, Commerce, and the 
Production of Racial Categories in Medicine, 4 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 1 (2004) 
(discussing implications of using race as a research category). 
 27. See, e.g., Rene Bowser, Race as a Proxy for Drug Response: The Dangers and Challenges of 
Ethnic Drugs, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1111 (2004) (suggesting that racial targeting in drug research may 
harm African Americans); Ruqaiijah Yearby, Good Enough to Use for Research, but Not Good 
Enough to Benefit From the Results of that Research: Are the Clinical HIV Trials in Africa Unjust?, 53 
DEPAUL L. REV. 1127 (2004) (questioning the fairness of HIV drug trials conducted in Africa for drugs 
that will never be sold in Africa). To be clear, the African American experience only illumes further the 
Native American experience with radiation studies, or the use of mentally disabled persons in other 
government-sponsored medical research projects. Harriet Washington and Dorothy Roberts stand out 
amongst the field of scholars working vigorously to excavate and archive this record, placing it in a 
proper historical context. 
 28. See infra III.C. 
 29. Elizabeth Dwoskin, The AIDS-Babies-as-Guinea-Pigs Story Is Finally Over. Right?, THE 
VILLAGE VOICE, April 1, 2009 ( “The majority of the 25 children who died during the trials were 
extremely sick with full-blown AIDS when they began the testing, which has led the researchers to 
believe it was unlikely that they died due to the medications. But they don’t know for certain. Without 
medical records, [investigators] say[], it is also impossible to know what the actual effects of the drugs 
were on any of the children or how much they suffered.”). 
 30. An even more recent example of such collusion is recent cornea-transplant scandals involving 
unwitting families and the corpses of African American and Latino gun-violence victims. See Ralph 
Frammolino, Harvest of Corneas at Morgue Questioned, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 2, 1997, at A1. 
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physicians to any additional liability or professional censure? Are there any 
lessons learned from the legal profession and the well developed literature on 
the professional ethics and responsibilities of lawyers? The answers, which we 
discuss in parts IV and V, relate to choice, information, and options. 
A. Medical Trust and Government-Sponsored Medicine: An Antebellum Story 
“Black bodies often found their way to dissecting tables, operating amphitheaters, 
classroom or bedside demonstrations, and experimental facilities.”31 
Slaves were involuntary subjects of early American experimentation.32 The 
Medical College of the State of South Carolina, “like other Southern medical 
schools, used live Africans extensively in medical demonstrations, and dead 
ones for dissection.”33 Doctors, through their use of female slaves as research 
fodder, developed gynecological advances, such as abdominal surgeries, the 
speculum, cesarean surgeries, and others that are still employed today. Medical 
accomplishments born on the bodies of enslaved Black women include Ephraim 
McDowell’s successful removal of ovaries34 and Francois Marie Prevost’s 
perfected cesarean section operations. 35 Perhaps the most notorious example is 
James Marion Sims’ experiments on enslaved women that earned him the 
distinction, “Father of Modern Gynecology.”36 
In his autobiography, The Story of My Life, Sims speaks passionately about 
experimenting on his female slaves year-round.37 He preferred to perform 
surgeries on enslaved women without anesthesia, although postoperatively, he 
provided them with opium.38 Dr. Sims wrote that Blacks endured pain far better 
than Whites,39 basing this scurrilous medical assertion on the numerous medical 
experiments and gynecological surgeries he personally performed on his two 
special women slaves, Lucy and Anarcha.40 Anarcha suffered through thirteen 
operations to correct her vesicovaginal fistula, a condition likely caused by her 
enslavement and the withholding of nutritious foods. Sims became famous for 
mastering the repair of vesicovaginal fistula.41 In his own words — 
I was always anxious to see the result of all experiments; but this was attended with 
such marked symptoms of improvement, in every way, that I was more anxious now 
than ever. When the week rolled around—it seemed to me that the time would never 
come for the removal of the sutures—Anarcha was removed from the bed and carried 
to the operation-table. With a palpitating heart and an anxious mind, I turned her on 
 
 31. Todd L. Savitt, The Use of Blacks for Medical Experimentation and Demonstration in the Old 
South, 48 J. S. LEGAL HIST. 331, 331 (1982). 
 32. See Martia Graham Goodson, Enslaved Africans and Doctors in South Carolina, 95 J. NAT’L 
MED. ASS’N, 225, 226 (2003) (describing the practice of “slave medicine”). 
 33. Id. at 226. 
 34. WASHINGTON, supra note 22, at 70. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Goodson, supra note 32, at 229. 
 37. See, e.g., J. MARION SIMS, THE STORY OF MY LIFE (1884). 
 38. WASHINGTON, supra note 22, at 66. 
 39. Id. at 65. 
 40. Id. at 63–65. 
 41. Id. at 66. 
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her side, introduced the speculum, and there lay the suture apparatus just exactly as I 
had placed it . . . . I had made . . . one of the most important discoveries of the 
age . . . .42 
 
Primum non nocere, “first do no harm,” remains the ethical guidepost for all 
physicians and surely Sims was not ignorant of this medical tenet. However, he 
clearly did not view his research subjects as “patients” or as individuals to 
whom he owed a moral duty or ethical obligation. Neither the law nor his 
cohorts disabused Sims of his lower regard for his African American research 
subjects. The law treated slaves as chattel for legal and social purposes, allowing 
Sims to do as he pleased with them. And although he described his experiments 
with extreme candor, precision, and passion, leaving very little room for doubt 
about the abuse conducted with his knife and scalpel, he faced no critique from 
his peers, protégés, and bioethicists. This speaks largely to the status of his 
research subjects and less to the notion that his experiments were bioethically 
ambiguous. In fact, Sims’ status was elevated rather than diminished by his 
medical conduct, likely because the medical benefits derived from his 
unrestrained research benefited wealthy, elite women. 
Medical experiments on slaves43 mark the beginning of a troubling era of 
scientific research and medicine involving African Americans. Complicating 
that period was the absence of a legal remedy for slaves used as research 
subjects. Their compromised legal status prevented them from bringing claims 
in battery and precluded criminal actions on their behalf. Furthermore, research 
protocols on which tort claims might have been based were decades from being 
enacted.44 Finally, as slaves, they could not avoid medical demands made on 
their bodies without risking further harm. 
B. Medical Trust and Government-Sponsored Medicine: A Deadly Syphilis 
Story 
Medical betrayal plays out in the minds of many African Americans as more 
than episodic. It is viewed as part of a systemic pattern of abuse that continued 
into the twentieth century, punctuated by what has been called “The Tuskegee 
 
 42. SIMS, supra note 37, at 245–46. 
 43. See id. (describing the frequent use of Blacks for surgical tests); see also, KATHERINE 
OLUKEMI BANKOLE, SLAVERY AND MEDICINE: ENSLAVEMENT AND MEDICAL PRACTICES IN 
ANTEBELLUM LOUISIANA (1998) (discussing the unethical medical treatment Blacks received in 
Louisiana when compared to Whites); Savitt, supra note 31, at 331 (noting Black bodies were often 
used in experiments and dissections); Katherine Olukemi Bankole, A Critical Inquiry of Enslaved 
African Females and the Antebellum Hospital Experience, 31 J. BLACK STUD. 517 (2001) (describing the 
treatment of slaves at the Touro Infirmary). 
 44. From the infamous prosecution and subsequent verdict against Nazi doctors, later known as 
the “Nuremburg Trial,” emerged a new standard of medical ethics known as the Nuremburg Code. 
Chief among the ten points outlined in the Code are informed consent, avoiding unnecessary physical 
and mental suffering, and the liberty of medical subjects to end the experiment at anytime. See TRIALS 
OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL 
LAW NO. 10 181–82 (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1949). 
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Study.” The notorious syphilis study sponsored by the U.S. Public Health 
Service (PHS) and carried out over a period of forty years by government 
doctors not only epitomizes research betrayal, but also standard medical care 
for African Americans.45 The infamous syphilis study was conducted on roughly 
400 Black men in the late stages of syphilis from 1932 until 1972.46 Researchers 
purposefully targeted these uneducated, mostly illiterate men, the majority of 
whom labored as sharecroppers in one of the poorest rural counties in 
Alabama.47 The men suffered from tertiary syphilis, which can result in 
blindness, tumors, heart disease, insanity, paralysis, and ultimately death.48 
However, researchers purposefully avoided telling the men about the disease or 
how it destroys the body.49 Instead, most were simply told that they tested 
positive for “bad blood.”50 
The purpose of the study was to collect data on the corpses of men ravaged 
by syphilis.51 Since research was intended to truly begin at the autopsies,52 these 
unwitting study participants were never informed when a relatively inexpensive 
cure became available.53 They were meant to die during the period of 
observation. The PHS researchers attempted to justify their study and conduct, 
explaining the pressing social need to document and confirm that White bodies 
and Black bodies respond differently to diseases and even to medical 
treatments.54 
The Tuskegee Study is thought to be the longest non-therapeutic medical 
study on human beings in the world.55 By 1997, when President Clinton 
apologized for the government’s complicity in conducting the study, only eight 
survivors remained.56 Their fellow research subjects eventually died from 
syphilis or syphilis-related diseases.57 The collateral toll extended to their 
families as well: forty wives were infected and at least nineteen children of the 
participants were born with congenital birth defects resulting from syphilis.58 
 
 45. See Savitt, supra note 31, at 331 (noting that doctors used Blacks in medical demonstrations 
and dissections). Savitt writes, “Further investigation into this subject indicates that southern White 
medical educators and researchers relied greatly on the availability of Negro patients for various 
purposes.” Id. at 331. 
 46. Jay Katz, The Consent Principle of the Nuremberg Code: Its Significance Then and Now, in 
THE NAZI DOCTORS AND THE NUREMBERG CODE: HUMAN RIGHTS IN HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION 
230 (George J. Annas & Michael A. Grodin eds., 1992); WASHINGTON, supra note 22, at 163. 
 47. WASHINGTON, supra note 22, at 156, 161–66. 
 48. Id. at 159. 
 49. Id. at 161–66. 
 50. Id. at 162. 
 51. Id. at 164–66. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 165–68. 
 54. See, e.g., id. at 37. 
 55. Id. at 169–70. 
 56. Id. at 184. 
 57. Id. at 168. 
 58. Id. at 166. 
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Coercion, fear, and social manipulation were the modus operandi for the 
researchers who collected and retained the men in the Tuskegee Study. In fact, 
the participants were promised free medical care and coerced through 
communications that warned of their “last chance” for free medical care.59 The 
medical care provided included painful spinal taps and aspirin camouflaged in 
pink pills, described as “special pills,” to the illiterate farmers.60 
 It was not the experiment alone that makes the syphilis study emblematic 
of medical betrayal. The Tuskegee Study survives in the memories of 
bioethicists and African Americans not only because the victims were coerced 
by doctors in their unfettered pursuit of syphilis-ridden corpses, but also 
because the experiment continued in the wake of international criticism of Nazi 
experimentation. Indeed, government doctors and lawyers condemned Nazi 
doctors for engaging in notorious medical experiments on concentration camp 
victims. However, the federally-funded syphilis study continued through liberal 
and conservative presidential administrations, transitions in Congress, the 
drafting of the Nuremberg Code and the Declaration of Helsinki, and the US 
adoption of the Code of Federal Regulations. The study continued even after 
the discovery of penicillin, the gold-standard treatment, which cures syphilis.61 
According to former President Clinton, “The United States government did 
something that was wrong—deeply, profoundly, morally wrong. It was an 
outrage to our commitment to integrity and equality for all our citizens . . . .”62 
He remorsefully offered, “To our African American citizens, I am sorry that 
your federal government orchestrated a study so clearly racist.”63 Some African 
Americans remain leery of government-sponsored or related programs 
involving the body years after the infamous syphilis study.64 
 
 
 59. Id. at 163. 
 60. FRED D. GRAY, THE TUSKEGEE SYPHILIS STUDY: THE REAL STORY AND BEYOND 53, 59 
(1998); JAMES H. JONES, BAD BLOOD: THE TUSKEGEE SYPHILIS EXPERIMENT 127–31 (1981). 
 61. Id. at 165–68. 
 62. Id. 13. 
 63. WASHINGTON, supra note 22, at 184. 
 64. In testifying before a congressional subcommittee, Dr. Benjamin Payton, then-President of 
Tuskegee University, urged lawmakers to understand why “African Americans exhibit a 
disproportionately large amount of cynicism and lack of confidence in the U.S. health and research 
establishment. Some studies link that mistrust to a long history of medical abuse extending back as far 
as slavery. Others assert a more recent and direct relationship to what has come to be called ‘The 
Tuskegee Experiment’ that was conducted by the Public Health Service . . . on poor Black males in 
Alabama.” Hearings Before the H. Appropriations Comm. Labor, Health and Human Services, and 
Education Subcomm., 105th Cong. (1998) (prepared testimony of Benjamin F. Payton). 
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C. Medical Trust and Government-Sponsored Medicine: Eugenics—Silencing a 
Poor White Race 
Race, reproduction, and medicine cannot be strictly defined by, or confined 
to, an African American narrative.65 The perimeters of reproductive trust are 
bounded by the American tale of eugenics and the forced sterilization of 
thousands of White boys, girls, men, and women who were deemed socially 
unfit.66 Paul Lombardo, the preeminent scholar tracking this woeful legacy, 
writes about government complicity in crafting statutes that permitted 
compulsory sterilization in order to prevent states from being “swamped” by 
the socially unfit.67 Lawyers and doctors helped implement and enforce eugenic 
laws. 
Indiana passed the first eugenics law in the nation68 and, by the time of the 
infamous Supreme Court decision in Buck v. Bell69 approving the constitutional 
legitimacy of compulsory sterilizations, dozens more states had followed 
Indiana’s example.70 Compulsory sterilization laws targeted poor, homeless, 
illiterate White citizens in states across the country, although the laws were 
often couched in public-health terms—to eradicate epilepsy, mental 
 
 65. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (striking down a state statute that forced 
sterilization on felons); Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927) (condoning forced sterilization on feeble-
minded Whites). African American women nonetheless figured prominently in the eugenics movement. 
See Rebecca Sinderbrand, A Shameful Little Secret: North Carolina Confronts Its History of Forced 
Sterilization, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 28, 2005, at 33 (describing the psychological trauma and continuing 
legal battle of African American women sterilized in North Carolina). For one victim, Sinderbrand 
reports the following: 
She soon learned that the operation had been performed by state order in North Carolina in 
1968, when she was just 14, and had given birth to a baby after being raped. At the time, she’d 
assumed doctors were just performing a routine post-birth procedure. The sterilization-
consent form had been signed by her neglectful father and her illiterate grandmother, who had 
marked her assent with an X. 
Id. at 33; see also DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY 59–76 (1997) (describing the birth 
of the eugenics movement in America and its interest in Blacks). Thousands of African American 
women were sterilized during the twentieth century. Many were considered feeble-minded or 
degenerates to society. Post-slavery African American women’s once-exploited reproductive abilities 
were of little value and rather a “social” threat. State-sponsored sterilizations occurred in more than 
half of the United States long after the Nazi’s horrible regime of experimental medicine had been 
exposed. Cf. Michele Goodwin, The Black Woman In The Attic: Law, Metaphor & Madness in Jane 
Eyre, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 597, 608 (1999) (noting Black women were targets of eugenic experiments in the 
late 1800s). 
 66. See generally Goodwin, supra note 1. 
 67. Paul A. Lombardo, Taking Eugenics Seriously: Three Generations of ??? Are Enough?, 30 
FLA. ST. U. L. REV.191, 216 (2003). 
 68. STEPHEN TROMBLEY, THE RIGHT TO REPRODUCE: A HISTORY OF COERCIVE 
STERILIZATION 51 (1988). 
 69. 274 U.S. 200 (1927). 
 70. A complete list of sterilization laws in each state can be found in THE NATIONAL CENTER FOR 
FAMILY PLANNING SERVICES, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, PUB. NO. 74-
16001, FAMILY PLANNING, CONTRACEPTION, AND VOLUNTARY STERILIZATION: AN ANALYSIS OF 
LAWS AND POLICIES IN THE UNITED STATES, EACH STATE AND JURISDICTION (1971), cited in 
Stephanie Hyatt, A Shared History of Shame: Sweden’s Four-Decade Policy of Forced Sterilization and 
the Eugenics Movement in the United States, 8 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 475, 490 n.98 (1998). 
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retardation, alcoholism, and criminality. Eugenicists erroneously believed that 
poverty, criminality, and homelessness were genetically inscribed. 
The Buck v. Bell decision legitimized state suppression of reproductive 
freedom for poor Whites. Carrie Buck, a poor White teenager and the 
petitioner at the center of the case, had been raped.71 According to Virginia 
state law, Buck qualified for compulsory sterilization because she was declared 
“feeble-minded” by doctors at the state facility where she, her mother, and 
other poor, illiterate Whites, were incarcerated.72 The Supreme Court of 
Appeals of Virginia explained that forced sterilization of minors and others did 
not constitute cruel and unusual punishment, distinguishing it from “such bodily 
punishments as involve torture and are inhumane and barbarous.”73 
According to Justice Holmes in a nearly unanimous opinion (Butler 
dissenting), it would be odd if the state of Virginia could not impose upon those 
“who already sap the strength of the State for these lesser sacrifices, often not 
felt to be such by those concerned, in order to prevent our being swamped with 
incompetence.”74 Holmes expounded, “It is better for all the world, if instead of 
waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their 
imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing 
their kind . . . . Three generations of imbeciles are enough.”75 The Justices found 
that the regulations that promoted public health and safety, such as vaccination 
laws, provided the precedent and model for sterilization laws.76 
The compulsory sterilization laws of the United States would later serve as 
the model for Nazi eugenics laws.77 At the Nuremburg Trials years later, Nazi 
doctors used as their defense that they were only following the practices 
initiated in the United States decades prior.78 Their observations were offensive, 
but true. 
D. Medical Trust and Government-Sponsored Medicine: A Contemporary  
Story? 
“The irony is that anyone who knows anything about maternal care in prisons would 
never send a pregnant woman there to protect the fetus.” 79 
Sex, race, and class continue to play a defining role in reproductive politics 
in the United States. Nowhere is that observation better captured than in Dr. 
 
 71. Judith F. Daar, Accessing Reproductive Technologies: Invisible Barriers, Indelible Harms, 23 
BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 18, 79. 
 72. Buck, 274 U.S. at 205. 
 73. Buck v. Bell, 130 S.E. 516, 519 (Va. 1925), aff’d, 274 U.S. 200 (1927). 
 74. Buck, 274 U.S. at 207. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. (“The principle that sustains compulsory vaccination is broad enough to cover cutting the 
Fallopian tubes.”) (citing Jacobson v. Mass., 197 U.S. 11 (1905)). 
 77. WOLFGANG WEYERS, M.D., THE ABUSE OF MAN: AN ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF DUBIOUS 
MEDICAL EXPERIMENTATION 242 (2003). 
 78. Id. at 349–50. 
 79. Jean Reith Schroedel & Paul Peretz, A Gender Analysis of Policy Formation: The Case of Fetal 
Abuse, 19 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 335, 350 (1994). 
GOODWIN RICHARDSON 5/1/2010 1:16:55 PM 
238 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 72:223 
Marion Sims’ home state, South Carolina, which became the first to prosecute 
drug-addicted women by relying on medical evidence gathered by doctors and 
nurses at the Medical University of South Carolina (MUSC) and voluntarily 
submitted to police and prosecutors.80 South Carolina led the nation with the 
creation of fetal drug laws (FDLs) used to prosecute drug-addicted women 
essentially for becoming pregnant.81 
The pregnant women sought, and were encouraged to receive, prenatal 
services through a public-service-announcement campaign.82 Unbeknownst to 
the patients, the program focused on prosecuting women who used drugs during 
pregnancy.83 Nurses and doctors at MUSC agreed to provide prosecutors with 
evidence of their patients’ drug use by releasing the results of urine-sample tests 
to law enforcement.84 
Among the dozens of women fighting for their freedom after prenatal 
exams was Paula Hale, a rape victim.85 Hale was never offered rape counseling 
despite telling nurses at MUSC about the violence and abuse she suffered. 
Subsequently, like many girls and women with similar histories, she turned to 
illegal drugs.86 When Hale became pregnant as a result of that rape, she sought 
treatment at the only hospital she knew to serve poor Black women like 
herself—the MUSC. Again, “no one bothered to link her with an appropriate 
drug treatment program or a trauma institute.”87 Instead, nurses and doctors 
collected evidence of her drug use to turn over to police and prosecutors.88 Like 
the twenty-eight other Black women snagged by the MUSC, Hale was “dragged 
out of the hospital in chains and shackles.”89 
These haunting episodes conjure images of slavery.90 Indeed, race seemed to 
dominate every aspect of pregnant patients’ treatment at MUSC. With one 
exception, all the women turned over to police for using illegal drugs during 
 
 80. See Goodwin, supra note 1, at 1677; Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have 
Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419, 1420 (1991). 
 81. Roberts, supra note 80, at 1445–50. 
 82. Goodwin, supra note 1, at 1677. 
 83. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 71–72 (2001). 
 84. Id. at 71–72. 
 85. South Carolina Advocates for Pregnant Women & Nat’l Advocates for Pregnant Women, 
South Carolina: First in the Nation for Arresting African-American Pregnant Women—Last in the 
Nation for Funding Drug and Alcohol Treatment, Jan. 8, 2003, http://advocatesforpregnantwomen.org/ 
issues/briefingpaper.htm (last visited Feb. 9, 2008) [hereinafter First in the Nation]. Such prosecutions 
are epitomized as well by State v. McKnight, 576 S.E.2d 168 (S.C. 2003), in which Regina McKnight was 
convicted of homicide by child abuse after giving birth to a stillborn child who tested positive for 
cocaine. 
 86. Id.; see also Renae D. Duncan et al., Childhood Physical Assault as a Risk Factor for PTSD, 
Depression, and Substance Abuse: Findings from a National Survey, 66 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 437, 
443 (1996) (showing victims of childhood assault were much more likely than nonvictims to take illegal 
drugs). 
 87. First in the Nation, supra note 85. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
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pregnancy were Black.91 Regarding the exception, however, hospital officials 
made sure to note on her chart that the White patient “lives with her boyfriend 
who is a Negro.”92 Thus, it would appear that the program was racially 
motivated as well.93 
What normative conclusions should emerge from the stories of medical 
breaches of trust contained in this part? One conclusion is that vulnerable 
populations, and particularly African Americans, should be cautious, and 
justifiably so, about the type and quality of relationships they seek to develop 
with the medical community and with government-supported medical 
programs.94 Trust and loyalty are critical values and components of doctor-
patient relationships. Yet, certain populations, like African Americans, have 
good reason to be skeptical while other populations may not. Ironically, 
however, these vulnerable populations who should be the most skeptical about 
medical trust and loyalty are also often the same populations that lack the 
opportunity and luxury of choice. This observation is critical to remember when 
considering our proposal for an ex post test of reasonableness in part V. 
IV 
TRUST AND LOYALTY 
“Without some minimal level of trust, patients would not seek care, submit to 
treatment, disclose necessary information, or follow treatment recommendations.”95 
If institutions are perceived as untrustworthy, inefficient, and biased, they 
will lose participant trust, loyalty, and confidence. This hypothesis holds true in 
many contexts. However, as demonstrated by the Madoff scandal and the spate 
of other recent financial debacles including Enron and Tyco, investors, 
consumers, and sometimes government officials will ignore relevant 
information at their peril. 
This section analyzes whether the goals of established trust discourse 
properly and realistically align with contemporary challenges. It asks whether 
traditional trust discourses enable or burden patients. It resituates patients 
according to their abilities and capabilities. Subpart A. provides a brief analysis 
of the rationales for promoting a trust relationship between physicians and 
 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Goodwin, supra note 1, at 1677. 
 94. A defining literature in the fields of critical race scholarship, ethnic studies, women’s studies, as 
well as empirical studies, documents disparities and inequality in the treatment of African Americans. 
See, e.g., Cara A. Fauci, Racism and Health Care in America: Legal Responses to Racial Disparities in 
the Allocation of Kidneys, 21 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 35, 35 (2001) (asserting that African Americans 
have “long been subjected to racism within the health care sector”); Sidney D. Watson, Race, Ethnicity 
and Quality of Care: Inequalities and Incentives, 27 AM. J.L. & MED. 203, 204 (2001) (urging “adoption 
of a systemic approach to reducing race-based treatment disparities that uses reporting systems and 
financial incentives to produce structural change.”); Lindsey Tanner, Blacks’ Mental Care Lags that of 
Whites, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Mar. 13, 2002, at 33 (noting African Americans receive poorer medical care 
than Whites in the area of mental illnesses). 
 95. Hall, supra note 2, at 478. 
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patients. Subpart B. examines the rationality and reasonableness of patient trust 
in light of inherent problems and conflicts within that relationship. 
A. The Trust Relationship 
Trust is the willingness of individuals to make themselves vulnerable to 
others in the face of risks.96 Nowhere is this more prominently featured than in 
medicine, where patients must rely on diagnoses, information, and treatment 
decisions from their doctors. Within this context, patients expose themselves—
their medical histories, social histories, genetic information, and sexual pasts. 
Most scholars who address trust in medical relationships contend that 
patients benefit from a presumption of trust in their physicians.97 According to 
Mark Hall, “trust is the core, defining characteristic of the doctor/patient 
relationship, or, as is sometimes said, the “glue’ that holds the relationship 
together and makes it possible.”98 According to Grant Morris, “trust is vitally 
important for therapeutic purposes. With trust, the patient is willing to share 
sensitive and confidential information, to be confident in the physician’s clinical 
judgment, and to comply with the physician’s recommended treatment.”99 
Frances Miller notes that patient trust is integral to the healing process, and that 
patients who trust their physicians are more likely to follow their physicians’ 
recommendations.100 
More explicitly, Robert Gatter, a leading medical-law scholar, urges that 
patients’ trust in their physicians should be presumptive “because most patients 
are not able to treat themselves or. . .direct the medical treatment they receive 
from another.”101 His observation is grounded in the principle that “[t]rust is at 
 
 96. Hill, supra note 2, at 1724. Distrust involves a pessimistic attitude, a wariness, about the risk of 
making oneself vulnerable to another. Hall, supra note 2, at 513. 
 97. See Kathy L. Cerminara, The Class Action Suit As A Method of Patient Empowerment in the 
Managed Care Setting, 24 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 17 (1998) (arguing that “[p]atients who trust their 
caregivers often report more favorable treatment outcomes”); Robert Gatter, Unnecessary Adversaries 
at the End of Life: Mediating End-of-Life Treatment Disputes to Prevent Erosion of Physician–patient 
Relationships, 79 B.U. L. REV. 1091, 1099 (1999); Leon R. Kass, Neither for Love nor Money: Why 
Doctors Must Not Kill, PUBLIC INTEREST, Winter 1989, at 25, 35 (implying that patients’ wholehearted 
trust in physicians is ideal and that “[t]he patient’s trust in the doctor’s wholehearted devotion to the 
patient’s best interests will be hard to sustain” if doctors assist with suicides); Peter D. Jacobson & 
Michael T. Cahill, Apply Fiduciary Responsibilities in the Managed Care Context, 26 AM. J.L. & MED. 
155, 157 (2000) (“The basic need for trust . . . is incontrovertible. Absent trust, managed care cannot 
survive.”); Frances H. Miller, Trusting Doctors: Tricky Business When It Comes to Clinical Research, 81 
B.U. L. REV. 423, 426–27 (arguing that patient trust is a critical ingredient in the physician–patient 
relationship); Starla Kay Roels, HIPAA and Patient Privacy: Tribal Policies as Added Means For 
Addressing Indian Health Disparities, 31 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1 (2006) (explaining how HIPAA 
regulations will foster trust and suggesting that when patients trust their doctors they will “more fully 
participate in their own care”). 
 98. See Mark A. Hall, Trust, Law, and Medicine: Towards a Therapeutic Jurisprudence of Health 
Care Delivery, 55 STAN. L. REV.  463 (2002). 
 99. See Grant H. Morris, Dissing Disclosure: Just What the Doctor Ordered, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 313, 
344 (2002). 
 100. Miller, supra note 97, at 426. 
 101. Gatter, supra note 97, at 1099. 
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the ethical core of the physician–patient relationship and is essential to the 
process of medical decision-making.”102 Gatter explains that the physician–
patient relationship requires this level of engagement. Gatter challenges the 
proposition (espoused in this project) that the physician–patient relationship is 
vertically positioned, with physicians at the top holding disproportionate power. 
He argues that this portrayal inaccurately captures the relationship.103 
This article takes a different approach, arguing for greater nuance in trust 
discourse and articulating the inherent weaknesses in patients’ presuming trust 
in physicians based on little more than an assumption that trust is warranted, 
deserved, or necessary. In traditional trust discourse, the concern for patient 
and physician fidelity is framed as a moral issue. In other words, patients should 
trust their physicians because it is the right thing to do; physicians will better 
serve patients whom they believe trust them; and patients should trust that 
physicians are qualified to provide the treatments they offer. At some point, the 
arguments become circular. 
Missing is an alternative, but equally credible theory, to capture the patient- 
physician interaction. For example, is it a morally grounded trust that inspires 
patients’ confidence in physicians or an understanding that physicians are 
obligated by law to be licensed to practice medicine? Is trust grounded in the 
understanding that, absent a physician’s due diligence and competence in a 
medical procedure, a patient can turn to courts to vindicate their concerns? 
Medical law scholars gravitate to the language of trust when other dynamics 
offer equally and perhaps more plausible explanations of a patient’s perspective 
in the medical suite. Traditional discourse explains that trust in physicians is 
essential—and patients voluntarily surrender it—because physicians possess 
“requisite medical knowledge and technical skill to effectively treat patients.”104 
For some patients, trust is not what motivates their compliance with physicians. 
Rather, a lack of alternatives or an emergency prompts their obedience. For 
others, it may be intimidation or simple acquiescence because it seems to be the 
right thing to do. And yet for others, reliance may be the dynamic that best 
describes the interaction between patients and physicians, with trust adding 
little value to the patients’ experience. In this way, some patients may perceive 
themselves as contracting parties with physicians, rather than purveyors of trust. 
Medical law scholarship portrays alternative values and dynamics (to trust) 
in the physician patient relationship as either destructive or absent. But, neither 
tort law nor medical ethics require physician competence because of patient 
trust. Rather, that physicians are held to an elevated standard of competency, 
skill, and professionalism has very little if anything to do with patient trust. 
Instead, physician professionalism and the obligation to render care with 
competence are grounded in physician ethics (i.e. fidelity to the profession) and 
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tort law. Thus, perhaps what patients really cling to is not medical trust, but the 
strength of the law to deter physician negligence, and the specter of tort law 
remedies to incentivize good behavior. 
The goal of this project is not to suggest that trust has no place or value 
within the physician–patient relationship.105 The most salient and persuasive 
arguments for promoting the trust relationship between physicians and their 
patients are grounded in the public health. As a public-health matter, society 
has a vested interest in the health and well-being of its communities. The 
inability to trust the quality, effectiveness, and confidentiality of care received 
from medical professionals erodes confidence in the medical system. When 
confidence in medical institutions and doctors erode, individuals are less likely 
to seek treatment for medical ailments. If and when the sick seek treatment 
from untrustworthy medical institutions, it is likely as a last resort, at a time 
when their medical conditions may be incurable or infectious. On the other 
hand, when trust is maximized and broadly realized, unhealthy people are likely 
to seek medical care and reduce the spread of disease. Thus, trust can be seen as 
promoting public health. 
Patients come to their physicians at their most vulnerable. Their 
vulnerability is demonstrated not only by their maladies but by the inability to 
diagnose, treat, prescribe medications, and rehabilitate on their own. Ethicists 
and scholars describe this vulnerability as creating a mental and physical state in 
patients that generates the desire to trust physicians.106 To ease their suffering or 
doubts about the quality of their care and treatment during periods of high 
vulnerability, it may be less stressful for patients to rely blindly on the loyalty of 
their physicians. Trust thus serves a medical function in that it likely reduces 
stress, tension, worry, skepticism, and second–guessing in the physician–patient 
relationship. 
B. The Reasonableness of Relying on the Trust Relationship 
Yet there are problems in relying on the trust relationship. As a result of 
“blind trust,”107 patients may rely too much on doctors and fail to adequately 
investigate treatment options. In essence, willful blindness disserves patient 
interests as well as the legitimacy of the medical profession. 
Patients generally believe that physicians have their best interests in mind as 
part of the relationship.108 But whether such a perception emanates from 
individual relationships, or is imposed by an external ethic, is debatable. 
Whether trust in these relationships is always rational or reasonable might also 
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 106. Gatter, supra note 97, at 1099. 
 107. This article uses “blind-trust” to mean undeserved loyalty and commitment to a physician in 
absence of demonstrable care, concern, commitment, expertise, medical history, and common goals. 
 108. Hall, supra note 2, at 474 (noting those who trust believe the trustee has their best interests at 
heart). 
GOODWIN RICHARDSON 5/1/2010 1:16:55 PM 
Fall 2009] PATIENT NEGLIGENCE 243 
be debatable.109 For example, is it rational and reasonable to trust if a patient 
fears that projecting a lack of trust will result in inferior care ?110 Is it rational 
and to the patient’s benefit to blindly trust a doctor whose behavior or history 
demonstrates negligence, abuse, or significant conflicts of interests? In both 
instances, we think not. 
Patients trust doctors because doing so is likely the easiest course of action 
when an illness first develops. To some extent, patients trust doctors in much 
the same way that they trust the police. That is to say, trust arises not from the 
promise of a uniquely personal relationship, but rather by necessity, by what 
patients perceive they should or must do.111 In an emergency, a burglarized home 
owner knows to call the police, but might choose not to be picky about who 
responds to the 911 call (or equally, might be afraid to articulate disagreement 
or discontent with the officer’s treatment of the case because of relative 
positions of power and authority). Similarly, patients may initially trust their 
doctors because of their need for information, care and treatment, even when 
they have no say in choosing the physician who treats them. 
But, continuing to trust is not necessarily rational. Trust can cause patients 
to ignore signals relevant to evaluating whether a positive, effective relationship 
can develop with her medical professional. Signs that would certainly be 
relevant in other interpersonal contexts may be ignored, such as a physician’s 
dismissive behavior, impatience when questions are asked, reliance on 
ultimatums, rude or belittling comments, and an overt lack of respect towards 
the patient. Furthermore, because of over-reliance or “over trust,” patients 
might fail to seek relevant medical information, alternative treatment 
possibilities, and second medical opinions. 
Relying too much on trust could mean that patients fail to engage in 
reasonable, responsible behaviors to monitor their health and to critique the 
treatment options provided. These issues become more relevant in a biotech-
transfer age, in which patient–physician conflicts of interest are more apparent 
than ever before, and in which patients believe that there is more to lose. These 
conflicts might involve patient-data mining,112 a physician’s financial interest in 
prescribing patients a certain treatment or drug,113 in patenting and profiting 
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from cell lines or therapies derived from patients without their consent,114 or in 
the conflicts inherent in some assisted-reproductive strategies115 and in plastic 
surgeries.116 
Conflicts may arise in any professional relationship. With physicians, 
however, those conflicts can be more damaging because, unlike financial losses, 
the harms can be very difficult to mitigate. In the physician–patient relationship, 
patients invest by disrobing physically and emotionally, providing deeply 
confidential information often unshared with family and friends. As the MUSC 
prosecutions demonstrate, the fiduciary breaches in these contexts are not only 
harmful to patients, but more devastating than in other situations.117 In the 
MUSC cases, fiduciary breaches resulted in pregnant women giving birth while 
their legs were shackled, and in some being transported to prison while still 
bleeding from after birth. 
Furthermore, when medical trust is violated, as arguably occurred in the 
MUSC cases, few if any viable recourses exist for victims. In the worst cases, 
unlike other fiduciary relationships, the criminal law is rarely involved to 
address the “public breach” aspect of physician malfeasance even when 
significant harms, including death, result.118 Why should investor fraud be 
treated as a public breach and not medical fraud—such as deceptively luring 
patients to engage in dangerous clinical trials or to submit to unnecessary, costly 
medical procedures—when the consequences of medical fraud are much more 
devastating? These questions are beyond the scope of this article. However, the 
lack of criminal sanctions removes a significant deterrent to physician breaches 
of trust. Hence, it is more important for patients to constantly and carefully 
evaluate whether trust is deserved. 
V 
EVALUATING TRUST 
Society is often disrupted by fiduciary breaches of trust. Recent scandals 
involving Enron, Madoff, and Tyco provide an economic counterpart to 
medical fraud. Defrauded investors and their advocates lament their losses and 
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the betrayal of trust. Against the backdrop of those cases are pressing 
questions: How preventable were the losses? To what extent was trust a factor 
in the fiduciary breach? Was reliance on the fiduciary reasonable? These 
questions are often unspoken. But if those defrauded were in the best position 
to prevent their losses, how should tort law respond? Is strict liability the best 
approach in fiduciary-breach scenarios, or would a comparative negligence 
approach work better—holding clients, consumers, and patients accountable for 
unreasonably relying on fraud or malpractice-prone fiduciaries? 
History is replete with examples of medical wrongs that explain why it might 
be reasonable for some groups to mistrust the profession.119 Implicit in that 
observation is a normative question: Why should those harmed by their doctors 
continue to trust without requiring the doctors to demonstrate care, concern, 
commitment, and loyalty? Why should tort law provide a remedy for patients 
without imposing some duty to mitigate? 
Without patient trust, some scholars believe the “conceptual foundation of a 
good and just physician–patient relationship would erode.”120 We do not argue 
against trust in the physician–patient relationship. Rather, we urge that the trust 
relationship be reconceptualized to read a patient-focused standard of 
reasonableness into the trust relationship. Quality patient care should be the 
focus of the physician–patient relationship, and achieving that objective may be 
obscured by the notion that patients owe physicians blind trust. 
Part IV builds from the prior section, judging victimhood and empowerment 
on a conceptual scale. It articulates why a reframing of the trust dialogue in the 
physician–patient context is necessary. In this section, we begin to articulate 
what the more appropriate ex-post inquiries might be to determine reasonable 
conduct. Here, we establish a test that considers consumer competence; 
knowledge; prior experience; information availability; and resources to 
investigate. Such a test, we argue, provides a more nuanced approach to 
ascertain whether and in what instances it might be reasonable for a client or 
patient to rely on a fiduciary. 
A. Owed Trust 
As a matter of first principles, this project explicitly acknowledges the value 
of a healthy, well-functioning medical profession. The trust relationship is a 
central component in determining how best to achieve that goal. But why 
should patients owe physicians loyalty in the absence of demonstrated 
competence, compassion, care, concern, and loyalty? 
When patients believe that trust is owed to physicians and must be 
surrendered without demonstration of loyalty, a hierarchy is reified in the 
relationship that places the patient at the bottom of the vertical scale and 
physicians at the top. The problems located within the hierarchy are the 
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disempowerment of patients, creating instant victims, rather than active 
participants in the patients’ own medical goals. Trust should be treated as an 
option (to be strived for and earned) within the physician–patient relationship. 
Rather than patients owing physicians trust, patients should realize 
independent options. The physician–patient relationship can be judged on a 
scale similar to personal relationships—such as those in a business, a contract, 
or between friends and spouses—that involve choice, respect, expressions of 
loyalty, demonstrable signs of care, concern, and commitment. In those 
instances, trust is a value that must be earned, not one relinquished upon 
demand or by coercion. 
Normatively, it might not make sense for patients to always trust their 
physicians, particularly when risks are high. In high-risk medical scenarios, 
patients may have more to lose through physician malfeasance, and the relative 
gains might not always be clear (particularly where conflicts arise). “The 
willingness to take th[e] risk [to trust] turns on both the magnitude of the 
perceived risk and the degree of harm that the truster will suffer if it turns out 
that the trust was misplaced.”121 
What changes in a reframing of trust? By reframing trust from an implicit 
obligation on the part of patients to one that is shared with their physicians, 
based upon a reasonable conclusion that trust is deserved, patients become 
empowered in their ability to choose. The value of choice should not be 
underestimated, for blind trust can lead to uninformed decision-making, lack of 
empowerment, frustration, poor health outcomes, and litigation. Blind trust is 
an irrational and unreasonable option for the patient. When trust is reframed, 
patients assume greater responsibility for their medical care, thereby shifting 
from powerlessness to sharing some fault (possibly) in preventable, poor 
medical choices. 
B. Reasonableness: The Patient Negligence Test 
A modified trust framework could achieve a few important social goals. By 
realigning trust, patients would become better healthcare consumers, likely to 
be better informed about their choices in medical care, including their selection 
of doctors. They would also understand the importance of asking questions 
about the type of care they receive, engage in independent research, scrutinize 
medical opinions, seek second and third options, and be more discerning in 
reading the signs of loyalty. Importantly, reframing trust and creating better 
consumers of patients will inure benefits to doctors as well as patients. 
Better-informed patients are likely to seek out doctors who share similar 
values, concerns, and acceptable styles of interaction. One significant problem 
in the physician–patient relationship may be the inability to effectively 
communicate. A patient who no longer feels obligated to expend trust and 
invest in a relationship plagued with poor communication will likely seek a 
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doctor with a better bedside manner. In this way, patient and physician styles of 
interaction might better align to forge healthier relationships that are defined 
by choice rather than by obligation. As a corollary, doctors are less likely to feel 
guilty, stressed, and obligated to serve patients whom they feel less comfortable 
about treating. 
Splicing reasonableness into a trust framework holds many potential 
benefits for patients and physicians. But how should reasonableness be 
determined? Should it be an objective standard or one subjective to the 
patient? A subjective standard would view the level of reasonableness from the 
perspective of each individual patient, requiring an inquiry into the frame of 
mind of each during the period leading up to fiduciary breach. An objective 
standard would give less deference to the internal psychology of individual 
patients and base reasonableness on community standards, akin to the test for 
reasonable care in a medical malpractice suit.122 In most medical malpractice 
cases, the standard of care is the fundamental issue to be established by the 
plaintiff. The critical question centers on what standard is to be applied, namely 
what is the community standard for the particular medical treatment in 
question. The answers are generally derived locally, except where there is 
conflict between a well-established national protocol and that of doctors in the 
local community. 
In this case, the standard should be an objective one, taking the perspective 
of a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position. The reason for this standard is 
that the very nature of this proposal urges patients to be more invested in their 
medical decision-making. At first glance, such a standard might appear to 
disserve the most vulnerable patients such as Paula Hale, whose use of the 
MUSC medical facility was based on a seeming lack of options, as she was 
indigent, pregnant, and addicted to drugs.123 However, by judging 
reasonableness from the perspective of a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s 
situation, the Patient Negligence Test (PNT), which we propose, considers the 
spectrum of patient options and abilities. Under the PNT, there are five patient-
focused factors for courts to consider: competence, knowledge, prior 
experience, access to information, and resources to investigate. The PNT 
provides a more nuanced approach to ascertain whether, and in what instances, 
it might be reasonable for a client or patient to rely on a fiduciary. This 
standard would apply to tort litigation in which patients are seeking remedies 
for physician malfeasance. In all cases, patient negligence should be capped at 
ten percent of the harm’s value. 
By incorporating a reasonableness test that considers our five factors, courts 
would be more likely to make sound decisions as to how reasonable it was for a 
patient to have followed a physician-prescribed protocol that was detrimental to 
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her health or that affected a legal right. And unlike traditional tort law, a 
patient of limited mental competence would not be comparatively liable for 
failure to make astute choices regarding her physician. Equally, a patient who 
lacked financial options to make alternative choices or who was limited by 
geography to seek alternative medical care might reasonably have trusted a 
physician who was otherwise not ideal. On the other hand, a competent, well-
informed, and educated patient, with access to good information, might be 
comparatively negligent in medical-malfeasance scenarios when it would have 
been unreasonable to opt for medical treatment from a physician who had 
already committed malpractice. 
There are limits to this approach that we acknowledge. Equally, there are 
questions that deserve a more thorough vetting than is provided for in this 
thought experiment. For example, an empirical study would corroborate or 
contradict the assumption pushed in most medial law scholarship that patient 
trust is presumptive; that it leads to better outcomes (for patients and 
physicians); and that it inspires physicians to provide better care to patients. 
Indeed, an empirical study analyzing whether the specter of the law (and its 
ability to provide remedies for patients and punish wrongdoers) equally 
motivates or satisfies patients’ concerns about seeking medical help would 
benefit the literature in this domain. 
To this end, qualitative data analyzing patients’ attitudes on trust will help 
to illuminate what really transpires between physicians and patients. 
Particularly, African Americans should be participants in such a study. Because 
of the historical use of African Americans as vulnerable rather than informed 
research subjects, and ongoing contemporary health disparities, we predict that 
African Americans will articulate a different version of what transpires between 
physicians and patients. For some African Americans, it may not be trust in 
operation that inspires their interaction with doctors, but rather reliance, and 
there is a distinction. 
As well, absent implementation of the model test promoted in this project, 
we will not know whether such a rubric provides greater equilibrium in the 
physician–patient relationship, and fosters greater equity, efficiency, and 
efficacy. Finally, some might question whether the concept of patient negligence 
would erode what is already a fragile relationship between some local hospitals 
and the communities they serve. 
In this project, we provide answers to questions based on case studies, 
medical legacy, intuition, and reasoned assumptions. And while no data exists 
to contradict our conclusions, there are other concerns that we must 
acknowledge. Since this article is a preliminary thought experiment, we do not 
attempt to offer more than a narrow framework here. This framework, 
however, provides a new, clearer lens through which one might begin to 
evaluate patient conduct as part of the larger physician–patient relationship. 
Evaluating patient conduct does not impose a punitive standard, but rather 
reconceptualizes patient autonomy and choice, thereby equalizing the 
GOODWIN RICHARDSON 5/1/2010 1:16:55 PM 
Fall 2009] PATIENT NEGLIGENCE 249 
physician–patient relationship, reordering the vertical nature of the 
relationship, and reframing trust as an owed value to one that is rightfully 
earned. 
VI 
CONCLUSION 
Patients trust in doctors based largely on what they do not know. “Because 
most patients are not able to treat themselves or to direct the medical treatment 
they receive from another, they turn their care over to the discretion and skill of 
a physician, laying their bodies and lives open to the physician.”124 In this space 
of vulnerability, patients are typically expected to give up reason as a feature of 
their exposure, susceptibility, and defenselessness. In other words, patients are 
not expected to advocate for themselves, and, as a result, they do not seek to 
empower themselves by becoming better-informed, better-prepared, or by 
making better choices—if they make any choices at all. At the backend of this, 
medical malpractice is used to rectify physician mistakes, even those that might 
have been predictable and preventable. We argue that too much trust might 
impose a heavy burden on patients and facilitate compliance with physician 
negligence. 
Behind the veil of trust are assumptions untenable for contemporary 
medicine. In an era rife with conflicts of interest involving pharmaceutical 
companies, clinical trials, patient mining, and high-cost non-therapeutic 
surgeries, patients should be wary about blind trust and loyalty. Indeed, medical 
practitioners should desire that patients become better informed about 
treatment plans and options. 
Thus, this article rejects the notion that trusting patients are better served 
patients; medical malpractice cases demonstrate the perversity of that logic. Nor 
does this article attempt to displace patient trust. We recognize trust as an 
important philosophical, legal, and ethical aspect of the physician–patient 
relationship: misaligned trust hurts patients’ interests. Yet misaligned trust 
might go undetected if patients fear their medical options will be limited or that 
they will be denied a high quality of care because of a failure to trust. 
Introducing comparative fault and reasonableness into the physician–patient 
trust framework dispels the notion that trust is a fixed concept. Perceiving trust 
as something patients owe to physicians disables patients and reifies a vertical, 
hierarchical patient–physician relationship. This power imbalance can lead 
patients to believe that trusting a physician is something they should or must do, 
rather than a choice to be bestowed upon a demonstration of merit. By turning 
the trust dialogue and framework on its head, we hope to disentangle what 
patients feel they must or should do from what they can do upon physicians’ 
demonstrating care, concern, commitment, competence, and loyalty. The 
Patient Negligence Test for reasonableness in trust scenarios is an objective 
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standard, which will inform patients as well as courts. It considers competence, 
knowledge, prior experience, access to information, and resources to investigate 
as important criteria to evaluate the reasonableness of trust or patient 
negligence. 
 
 
